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ATTORNEY FEES
Hadden v. Bowen, 851 F.2d 1266
Appellee Hadden filed a claim for attorney fees under the Equal
Access to Justice Act (EAJA) after successfully litigating her entitlement
to Social Security disability benefits. Under the EAJA, the government
must prove its position was substantially justified to avoid an award of
attorney fees to a successful claimant.
The Tenth Circuit reversed the award of attorney fees, holding that
the district judge erred by equating a lack of substantial evidence on the
merits with a lack of substantial justification under the EAJA. The court
stated that to do so would result in an automatic award of attorney fees
in all Social Security cases in which the government was unsuccessful on
the merits.
GHK Exploration Co. v. Tenneco Oil Co., 857 F.2d 1388
GHK Exploration sued Tenneco Oil for oil drilling costs allegedly
owed by defendant under an election to participate in a forced-pooling
order. At trial, the court addressed the issue of whether an election to
participate occurred. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit reversed, holding
that the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction due to plaintiff's failure
to exhaust its administrative remedies in the Oklahoma Corporation
Commission (Commission). Dismissed.
On plaintiff's petition for rehearing and upon defendant's motion
for award of attorneys' fees, the appeals court held dismissal of the action was proper, since the Commission has exclusive jurisdiction to determine if a party has elected to participate in a forced-pooling order.
The district court has jurisdiction only to enforce payment of any costs
owing due to a determination by the Commission that an election existed. The court denied attorneys' fees to the defendant. Only a prevailing party, and not merely a party for whom a cause of action has
been dismissed on grounds other than the merits, may win attorneys'
fees.
Glass and Phelps-Charteredv. Pfeffer, et al., 849 F.2d 1261
In an earlier appeal in this case, the Tenth Circuit affirmed a judgment dismissing a civil rights action brought against defendant police
officers. The district court ordered plaintiffs and plaintiff's counsel to
pay defendant Forster's attorney's fees. The district court ruled that
from the deposition it was clear that Forster was not present at the time
of the mistaken arrest and found no excuse for plaintiff's failure to voluntarily dismiss Forster from the action.
This appeal addresses only the propriety of the attorney's fee award
and its amount. The court found that award of fees against the plain-
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tiff's counsel was justified under the district court's inherent power and
was supported by finding that counsel willfully continued to advance
groundless and patently frivolous litigation against Forster after it was
determined he was not present at scene of alleged unlawful arrest and
that counsel's conduct was tantamount to bad faith. The court affirmed
that upon remand of the initial award, the district court was justified in
awarding additional monies for fees incurred in litigating entitlement to
original fee award where plaintiff's counsel, in opposing award, went
well beyond scope of remand order, greatly multiplying proceedings after remand. Additionally, the court affirmed it was appropriate to levy
attorney's fees against a firm that is responsible for the pleadings signed
by its employees. The court held the sanctions be applied against plaintiff's law firm as opposed to the individual attorney employed by the
firm.
The court found no abuse of discretion in the district court's refusal
to recuse itself on remand, warning that such a change is serious in nature and an affidavit seeking refusal is insufficient if it merely states conclusions, rumors, beliefs and opinions. Remand was required on the
limited issue of reasonable attorney's fees to be awarded against plaintiff's law firm for time spent by defendant's counsel in defending appeal.
Ikerd v. Lacy, 852 F.2d 1256
Plaintiff appeals the district court's order dismissing his complaint
and imposing fees for refiling. Additionally, plaintiff appeals the denial
of his motion for reconsideration and vacation of the foregoing order.
Affirmed.
Plaintiff filed a civil rights action which was set for preliminary hearing on August 12, 1986. Due to a conflicting court case, plaintiff's attorney did not attend this hearing. (Plaintiff contends counsel merely
arrived twenty minutes late.) Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(f) allowing
sanctions for failure to comply with pretrial orders, the district court
dismissed plaintiff's complaint without prejudice, and mandated that refiling a $500 per attorney fee be paid to each attorney present at the
hearing. Finding a conflicting court appearance insufficient to justify
missing a scheduled pretrial hearing, the Tenth Circuit held the imposition of sanctions here was no abuse of discretion.
Velasquez v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 844 F.2d
738
Attorney petitioned, pursuant to 30 U.S.C. § 932(a), for attorney's
fees incurred while representing a client on an appeal arising out of recovery for black lung disability benefits.
In granting the petitioning attorney only part of the amount requested, the Tenth Circuit set forth the following factors to be considered in determining the proper amount of such fees: Time and labor
required; novelty and difficulty of issues; preclusion of other employ-
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ment due to client's case; skill required; customary fee (whether fixed or
contingent); amount of damages awarded; experience and reputation of
attorney; undesirability of case; nature and length of relationship between attorney and client; and amount of fees awarded in similar cases.
Burkhart v. The Kinsley Bank, 852 F.2d 512
Plaintiff-appellee brought suit against defendant-appellant and
Cimarron Cooperative Equity Exchange, alleging that the two defendants conspired to convert, and did convert, to their own use, wheat belonging to appellees. The district court granted summary judgment for
the defendants. Along with the motion for summary judgment, defendants filed a motion seeking sanctions against appellees and their attorney. The district court denied this motion on the grounds there was no
"subjective bad faith" by the appellees or their attorney.
The appellants appealed this finding, and the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court, holding that subjective bad faith was not a prerequisite to an award of sanctions under Rule 11. On remand, the
district court again denied appellant's motion for sanctions. Affirmed.
The court of appeals first determined that the Tenth Circuit is committed to an "across the board" use of the "abuse of discretion" standard, rather than de novo review as argured by appellants. Referring to
comments by the district judge, the panel noted that decisions by a
judge in Kansas did support the appellees' legal position, thereby indicating that appellees' complaint was warranted by existing law. Thus,
the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's motion for sanctions.

